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Non-technical summary
University admission is organized very differently throughout the world. Prospective
students in the U.S. as well as graduate students in the UK need to apply directly at their
preferred universities. All undergraduate students in the UK, however, need to apply with
the central authority “UCAS” (Universities & Colleges Admission Service) and merely
indicate a preference list of universities. In Germany, the central clearinghouse (‘ZVS’)
allocates students to universities in those subjects which exhibit a shortage of university
places. As university admission procedures differ substantially between countries and
subjects, it is straightforward to ask: Is the centralized or decentralized procedure better
suited to match prospective students to universities?
To answer this question, I exploit the decentralization of university admission in the field
of German law studies as a natural experiment. In this subject the centralized admission
procedure via the central clearinghouse was replaced by a decentralized procedure in
2002. Using administrative data on all students at German universities and applying
a differences-in-differences strategy, the efficiency and quality of the student-university
matching is compared between the centralized and the decentralized procedure. My
outcome variables measuring matching efficiency and matching quality are (i) the number
of first-year students, (ii) the number of unassigned university places, and (iii) the drop-
out rate.
During the reform process, admission to all law schools except the ones in the largest
German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia was decentralized. Therefore, I use the
regional variation over time between law schools in and outside of North Rhine-Westphalia
for identification. As a second control group, I employ medical schools because admis-
sion to medical schools was centrally administered over the entire observation period.
Important to note is that both changes induced by the decentralization process – first,
the abolishment of the central clearinghouse and, second, the abolishment of admission
restrictions – are considered by my analyses.
The results of my study show that the number of first-year students has increased and the
number of unassigned places has decreased after the decentralization. This increase in
the matching efficiency is mainly driven by enabling law schools to abolish all admission
restrictions. My estimates with respect to the drop-out rates are not significantly affected
by the decentralization. Nevertheless, a comparison between the effects for all treated law
schools and for the subgroup of law schools which kept admission restrictions suggests
that abolishing admission restrictions could be associated with increasing drop-out rates.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Vergabeverfahren von Studienpla¨tzen sind international ho¨chst unterschiedlich aus-
gestaltet. Zuku¨nftige Studierende in den USA als auch Bewerber um ein Masterstudium
in Großbritannien bewerben sich direkt bei ihren pra¨ferierten Universita¨ten. Bachelor-
studienpla¨tze in Großbritannien hingegen werden entsprechend der Pra¨ferenzlisten der
Studenten zentral u¨ber die Vergabestelle “UCAS” (University & Colleges Admission Ser-
vice) zugeteilt. In Deutschland wiederum ist die Zentralstelle zur Vergabe von Studien-
pla¨tzen (ZVS, heute: Stiftung fu¨r Hochschulzulassung) nur fu¨r die Zulassung in Fa¨chern
mit knapper Platzzahl zusta¨ndig. Aufgrund dieser sehr heterogenen Vergabeverfahren ist
es naheliegend zu fragen: Ist die zentrale oder die dezentrale Vergabe von Studienpla¨tzen
besser fu¨r eine gute Passung zwischen Studenten und Universita¨ten?
Zur Untersuchung dieser Fragestellung bietet sich die Dezentralisierung der Studienplatz-
vergabe im Bereich der Rechtswissenschaften als natu¨rliches Experiment an. 2002 wurde
fu¨r dieses Fach das ZVS Verfahren eingestellt und die Platzvergabe direkt an die Uni-
versita¨ten u¨bertragen. Mit den administrativen Daten der Studentenstatistik und unter
Verwendung eines Differenzen-in-Differenzen Ansatzes wird so die Effizienz und Qualita¨t
der Passung im zentralen und dezentralen Prozess verglichen. Dafu¨r kommen die Indika-
toren (i) Anzahl der Erstsemester, (ii) Anzahl der nichtvergebenen Studienpla¨tze sowie
(iii) die Abbrecherrate zum Einsatz.
Die Dezentralisierung der Platzvergabe wurde mit Ausnahme von Nordrhein-Westfalen in
allen deutschen Bundesla¨ndern umgesetzt. Somit kann die Entwicklung der Passungsindi-
katoren u¨ber die Zeit zwischen den Fakulta¨ten inner- und außerhalb Nordrhein-Westfalens
zur Beurteilung der verschiedenen Vergabeverfahren genutzt werden. Als eine zweite
Kontrollgruppe zu den rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨ten werden die medizinischen Fa-
kulta¨ten herangezogen, da fu¨r diese der Zugang bis heute zentral u¨ber die ZVS geregelt
wird. Wichtig ist, dass die Dezentralisierung zum einen die Abschaffung des zentralen Ver-
gabeverfahrens zum anderen aber auch die Abschaffung jeglicher Zugangsbeschra¨nkungen
umfassen kann. Die Studie betrachtet daher beide Wirkungskana¨le auch separat.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen in Folge der Dezentralisierung eine steigende Zahl an Erstsemes-
tern sowie eine abnehmende Zahl an offenen Studienpla¨tzen in den Rechtswissenschaften.
Diese Verbesserung in der Effizienz der Passung ist jedoch vor allem durch die Aufhebung
von Zulassungsbeschra¨nkungen getrieben. Die Resultate bezu¨glich der Abbrecherrate zei-
gen hingegen keinen signifikanten Effekt auf die Qualita¨t der Passung. Ein Vergleich der
Fakulta¨ten mit und ohne Abschaffung der Zulassungsbeschra¨nkungen la¨sst jedoch vermu-
ten, dass Universita¨ten, die ihre Zulassungsbeschra¨nkungen fallen gelassen haben, nach
der Dezentralisierung eine ho¨here Abbrecherrate aufweisen.
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Abstract
Applying a differences-in-differences strategy, I study the decentralization of
university admission as a natural experiment. Is the centralized or decentralized
procedure better suited to match prospective students to universities? The anal-
ysis uses administrative data on all students within Germany and complements
the prominent theoretical literature on college admission. The results show that
the matching efficiency increased in course of the decentralization. This increase
is mainly driven by enabling law schools to abolish admission restrictions. The
matching quality is not significantly affected by the decentralization process but
suggests that abolishing admission restrictions could be associated with increasing
drop-out rates.
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1 Introduction
University admission can be either organized by a central clearinghouse or in a decentral-
ized process by the universities themselves. Prospective students in the U.S. as well as
graduate students in the UK, for example, apply directly at their preferred universities.
All undergraduate students in the UK, however, need to apply with the central authority
“UCAS” (Universities & Colleges Admission Service) and merely indicate a preference
list of universities. Historically, decentralized matching procedures were often object to
market failure and were therefore replaced by centralized mechanisms. A famous example
being the introduction of a central clearinghouse in the early 1950s for the entry-level
labor market for American physicians (Roth and Peranson; 1999).
Similarly in Germany, a central clearinghouse (‘ZVS’) was established in 1973 to admit
students in subjects with scarce university places as numbers of applicants were increas-
ing. However, the admission procedure for some subjects – e.g. for law studies in 2002 –
was decentralized again later on. Besides decreasing applications, another reason for this
turn was to allow for more competition between universities. Decentralizing university
admission comprised two major changes in the admission procedure. First, prospective
students apply directly at the universities and are subsequently directly admitted by
the universities without the coordination of a central clearinghouse. Second, universities
themselves decide on the admission criteria they apply. In fact, some universities abol-
ished all admission restrictions in course of the decentralization, which enabled students
to directly enroll into their programs.
In this paper, I exploit the natural experiment of a change from centralized towards
decentralized admission to German law schools in order to evaluate the centralized and
decentralized matching of students to universities. Using German administrative student
data and applying a differences-in-differences strategy, I study the student-university
matching with respect to the outcomes (i) the number of first-year students, (ii) the
number of unassigned university places, and (iii) the drop-out rates. As admission to
all law schools except the ones in the largest German federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia has been decentralized, I use the regional variation over time between law
schools in and outside of North Rhine-Westphalia for identification. In addition, I employ
medical schools as a second control group because admission to medical schools has been
centrally administered over the entire observation period. Furthermore, my analyses
consider both changes induced by the decentralization process the abolishment of the
central clearinghouse and of admission restrictions.
On the one hand, a decentralized admission process may be superior to a centralized
process as the universities arguably have the most comprehensive information to decide on
their student body. On the other hand, decentralized admission may increase uncertainty
1
in the process as students need to send out multiple applications and universities need
to overbook their places. The decentralized procedure, thus, may lead to (too) late
assignment, late enrollment, and unassigned university places (e.g. Roth and Xing; 1994;
Mu¨ller; 2007, 2009). Furthermore, if universities are overburdened with the admission
responsibilities, they may choose the wrong applicants resulting in less human-capital
production or higher drop-out rates. Since no admission procedure has been identified as
being clearly superior so far, discussions on the optimal university admission process are
currently ongoing in Germany as well as on an international level.1
The prominent theoretical literature on the “College Admission Problem” (Gale and
Shapley; 1962) studies different centralized matching mechanisms (a special set of rules
for assigning students to universities) with respect to their matching efficiency. The
centralized matching mechanisms are based on preference lists of students over universities
as well as on the preferences of universities over students. The literature building upon
the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962) identifies two competing mechanisms: the
college proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is optimal with respect to the
colleges’ preferences, and the student proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism, which is
student-optimal (Kelso and Crawford; 1982; Roth; 1984a). Within the college (student)
proposing version, students (colleges) are able to hold their so far most preferred offer
without accepting it right away. Colleges, however, have an incentive to state strategic
preferences within the college-optimal mechanism (Roth; 1985). 2 Within the related field
of school choice, Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2003) study the theoretical properties of
the “Boston Student Assignment Mechanism”. This priority matching mechanism tries to
match all students to their school of first choice. However, if a student cannot be assigned
at his first school choice, it is unlikely that he is placed at his second preference as all
places may already be taken by students who have been placed according to their first
choice. Therefore, students and parents strategically decide on the first choice within the
Boston matching mechanism. All in all, the theoretical literature on centralized matching
mechanisms points out that well-defined matching mechanisms exist but may be sensitive
to strategic behavior.
The more recent theoretical literature on decentralized matching is less comprehensive.
Roth and Vate (1990, 1991) are the first to extend the theoretical college admission
literature to decentralized systems by allowing some randomness within the matching
process. The literature shows that decentralized systems may produce efficient matchings
but also describes situations in which inefficiencies can occur (Roth and Xing; 1994; Pais;
1See the discussion in the UK on reforming the central admission authority ‘UCAS’ (UCAS; 2011).
2Further evidence on the college admission problem is provided by e.g. Roth (1984b); Roth and
Sotomayor (1989); Roth (1991); Kara and So¨nmez (1997); Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2005); Klaus
and Klijn (2006). For an introduction to the literature see Roth and Sotomayor (1992).
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2008b,a; Haeringer and Wooders; 2011). For example, Roth and Xing (1994) report on
imperfections that arise due to the timing of transactions within decentralized markets.
Despite the vast theoretical literature on college admission, empirical evidence is very lim-
ited. Portela et al. (2008) describe the centralized student allocation process in Portugal
and find a mismatch between demand and supply with some universities not being able
to fill their places. Related to college admission, Krishna and U¨nver (2008) compare two
centrally administered matching mechanism for course allocation at an American busi-
ness school. Using a field and a laboratory experiment, they show that efficiency can be
improved by implementing the student proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism. An-
alyzing a centralized application process to secondary schools, Ajayi (2011) finds that
imperfect information about admission chances and differing decision-making skills lead
to differences in application behavior. These differences are mitigated by two recent
policy reforms, which are examined as natural experiments.
More comprehensive empirical evidence exists within the related field of labor markets,
i.e. matching workers to firms. The theoretical literature on centralized matching, for
instance, has so far mainly been complemented by experimental and computational eco-
nomics studying centrally organized entry level labor markets for e.g. new physicians in
the US and the UK (e.g. Roth and Peranson; 1999; Kagel and Roth; 2000; Roth; 2002).
Empirical studies evaluating the matching efficiency of decentralized labor markets pre-
dominantly employ the approach of the matching function, which describes how the stock
of unemployed workers and vacancies translate into new matches/hires (see Petrongoli
and Pissarides; 2001; Pissarides; 2011, for a survey). Fahr and Sunde (2009), for exam-
ple, use the variation over time induced by a German labor market reform as a natural
experiment to show that the reform has improved the matching efficiency of the labor
market.
The German centralized college admission system is empirically analyzed by Braun et al.
(2010). They show that the applied matching procedure allows for strategic behavior
and moreover penalizes good secondary school graduates, although the mechanism is
supposed to be designed in favor of good students. Therefore, the theoretical papers by
Westkamp (2010) and Weiler (2009) suggest superior centralized matching algorithms for
university admission in Germany.3 With respect to decentralized admission in Germany,
Mu¨ller (2007, 2009) describes frictions induced by the necessity for prospective students
to apply at multiple universities. Thus, both the centralized and decentralized admission
procedure within Germany exhibit inefficiencies.
This paper contributes to the scarce empirical literature on university admission by evalu-
ating a change from centralized towards decentralized admission as a natural experiment.
3While Westkamp (2010) suggests a procedure in spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), Weiler (2009)
uses a computational optimization algorithm.
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My analyses provide new empirical evidence with respect to the matching efficiency and
matching quality of centralized and decentralized admission procedures. To my knowl-
edge, no such empirical evaluation study exists as yet. Roth (2002) suggests that exper-
imental and computational economics can complement the theory on mechanism design.
Similarly, I believe that evaluation studies exploiting natural experiments also provide
important complementary evidence. Moreover, the theoretical literature may identify
inefficiencies in matching procedures, while empirical evaluation studies – similar to Kr-
ishna and U¨nver (2008) – may also quantify how prevalent inefficiencies are in practice.
My analyses are only a first attempt to evaluate different procedures of university ad-
mission. More evaluation studies exploiting reforms in college admission procedures are
desirable. The extensive empirical literature on the related field of job matching may
suggest appealing directions to proceed.
The results of my comparison of centralized and decentralized university admission show
that the number of first-year students increased and the number of unassigned places de-
creased in course of the the decentralization. This suggests a superior matching efficiency
within the decentralized procedure. However, considering only a sample of law schools
that have kept their admission restrictions, I find no significant changes in these out-
comes. Therefore, the decentralization affects the matching efficiency mainly by enabling
law schools to abolish all admission restrictions. My estimates with respect to matching
quality show no significant changes in the drop-out rates induced by the decentralization.
Nevertheless, a comparison between the effects for all treated law schools and for the
subgroup of law schools which have always applied admission restrictions suggests that
abolishing admission restrictions could be associated with increasing drop-out rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I give a more de-
tailed overview on the institutional background of the German higher education system
as well as on the centralized and decentralized admission procedure (Section 2). Sub-
sequently, Section 4 describes the administrative student data, Section 5 exhibits first
descriptive evidence, Section 3 explains the differences-in-differences estimation strategy,
and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
Contrary to the U.S. higher education system, almost all German universities are publicly
funded and administered by one of the 16 German federal states. No tuition fees existed
until 2006. Usually, only a registration fee of about 100 Euro had been levied each term
by the universities. Therefore, the German higher education system has been considered
to be quite homogeneous with respect to university quality. However, competition be-
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tween different institutions has been encouraged by recent reforms. The Bologna Process
initiated in 1999 established a new Bachelor and Master degree system throughout Eu-
rope in order to create comparable tertiary degrees. This process also aims at increasing
the international competitiveness of the European system of higher education.4 Further-
more, some German federal states introduced tuition fees from 2006 onwards. As tertiary
education used to be free of charge, tuition fees were – and still are – a matter of intense
public discussions. Therefore, some federal states which once decided to levy fees today
have already abolished them again.5 In 2006 and 2007, the German government further
ran an excellence competition awarding extra funding to the universities with the best
future concept for top-level research.6
Along this development towards more competition in the German higher education sys-
tem, the university admission process has been decentralized for some subjects. Since
1973, the central clearinghouse has allocated university places in subjects for which places
were scarce. These subjects included e.g. law and medical studies, biology, psychology,
and business administration. As the number of applications were decreasing over time
and as students and universities recognized the central clearinghouse mainly as too bu-
reaucratic, some subjects abolished the centralized admission process from 2002 onwards.
In the field of law studies, the student-university matching procedure was decentralized
in 2002. The decision to decentralize admission to German law schools was taken very
surprisingly in spring 2002. The publication of the central clearinghouse, which was used
to inform the applicants of the year 2002, still indicated admission for law studies to be
part of the centralized process. However, this information was revised after the decision to
decentralize admission has been communicated. The decentralization induced two major
changes for the admission to law schools. First, the student-university matching is no
longer coordinated by the central clearinghouse. Prospective students after the reform,
thus, apply directly at the universities and are subsequently also directly admitted by the
universities. Second, universities within the decentralized admission procedure themselves
decide on the admission criteria they apply and may also abolish all admission restrictions.
The absence of any restrictions enabled prospective students to directly enroll into the
law programs of these universities. Hence, the decentralization process can affect the
outcome of the matching procedure via two channels: the abolishment of the central
coordination by the clearinghouse and the annulment of admission restrictions.
Important for my estimation strategy is that admission to law schools has not been
decentralized within the largest German federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. As
the central clearinghouse is located within the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia
4For an evaluation of the German Bologna Process see Horstschra¨er and Sprietsma (2010).
5For analyses regarding the introduction of tuition fees in Germany see Dwenger et al. (2012) and
Hu¨bner (2009).
6For an evaluation of the excellence initiative see Horstschra¨er (2011).
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and as North Rhine-Westphalian universities were also excluded from other nationwide
decentralization processes, this decision most likely was politically motivated. The central
clearinghouse, therefore, has been administering admission to law schools within North
Rhine-Westphalia also after the reform of 2002. As admission has been decentralized in
the other federal states, prospective students could apply directly at the schools outside
of North Rhine-Westphalia and simultaneously also for the centralized process within
North Rhine-Westphalia.
Before comparing the different matching procedures, let me explain the German central-
ized matching procedure in more detail. Centralized admission in Germany consists of
two separate steps. In a first step, the prospective students are selected for e.g. law
studies, and in a second step, they are allocated to universities. In the first step, the
central clearinghouse selected students by three different procedures, which are:
• Procedure G: Admission according to the final secondary school grade.
• Procedure W : Admission according to the time applicants have already been wait-
ing for admission.
• Procedure U : Admission according to criteria set by the universities.7
These three procedures are applied sequentially. First, all university places that are
supposed to be filled by procedure G are assigned, second, procedure W is applied,
and last in row is procedure U . The amount of places to be filled by each procedure
has been fixed in advance. In 2000 for example, 55% of the overall available university
places were assigned by the secondary school grade (G), 25% by the time of waiting
(W ) and 20% by the universities’ criteria (U). Due to political discussion and the public
debate on the drawbacks of the central clearinghouse, procedure U has become more
important over time. Until 1999, students have only been selected with respect to their
grade and their waiting time, while, since 2005, 60% of the places are filled according
to the universities’ criteria. Within procedure U , many universities, however, relied on
the secondary school grade as their only selection criteria (ZVS; 2000). Therefore, the
influence universities gained within the centralized admission process has been limited.
Furthermore, the change in the centralized procedure is only relevant for the subjects
remaining nationwide centrally administered after 2002 – e.g. medical studies. Within
the centralized admission process for law schools located in North Rhine-Westphalia only
procedure G and W have been applied again after the reform of 2002. The selection
criteria for these schools, thus, have not changed severely over time.
While prospective students in procedure U are selected and allocated in one step, students
selected within procedure G and W are allocated to universities in a separate second
7In fact, universities decide on the basis of the following admission criteria: (i) the final secondary
school grade, (ii) interviews with the applicants, (iii) the previous working experience, or (iv) a combi-
nation of these three.
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step. Prospective students in these two procedures are mainly allocated according to
their stated first university preference. In case more students indicated a university as
their first preference than this university offered places, the secondary school grade or
social criteria8 are used for tie-breaking. If a selected student cannot be matched to his
first choice, the central clearing house similarly tries to assign a place at the school of
second preference. However, all applicants who listed this college as their first preference
are placed at this college first. The tie-breaking rules for colleges changed several times
within the observation period, but the indicated first university preference has always
been most important for the allocation of prospective students in procedure G and W .
In order to relate the German admission procedure to the theoretical literature on college
admission, I can describe the second step of the centralized procedure, i.e. the allocation
of prospective students to universities, more formally. The allocation mechanism within
procedures G and W assigns students as follows:
• Step 1: For each university, consider the students who indicated the according uni-
versity as their first preference. Subsequently, assign the university places among
them according to their final secondary school grade (social criteria) until all stu-
dents are assigned at their first preference or no places remain.
• Step k: For each university with unassigned places, consider the students who
indicated the according university as their kth preference. Subsequently, assign the
university places among them according to their final secondary school grade (social
criteria) until all students are assigned at their kth preference or no places remain.
This procedure corresponds to the prominent “Boston Student Assignment Mechanism”
studied within the theoretical literature on school choice. The Boston priority-matching
mechanism has been shown to produce stable outcomes, i.e. a situation in which neither
a student nor a college prefer one another compared to their assignment. However, the
mechanism gives an incentive for strategic preference lists as prospective students may
not state their true preference but choose a school as their first choice at which they have
realistic chances to be admitted (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez; 2003).
The matching mechanism within procedure U corresponds to the college proposing deferred-
acceptance mechanism. Within the matching process, the universities with qu places ad-
mit the qu students who rank highest with respect to the universities’ preferences. Each
student subsequently accepts his highest-ranked offer and rejects all others. In turn, the
universities offer the places which remain unassigned after the first round to the highest-
ranked applicants who have not yet accepted an offer and who have not yet received an
offer by the according university. Again, students only accept the highest-ranked offer.
This algorithm stops when all students are assigned or when no places remain to be
8E.g. severe disabilities, spouse/child living close to the university, proximity to a student’s hometown
if registered at the parents home.
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allocated. The outcome of the college proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism is the
stable matching most preferred by colleges and least preferred by students (Roth; 1984a).
Furthermore, Roth (1985) shows that no college-optimal deferred-acceptance mechanism
exists, which makes it a dominant strategy for all colleges to state their true preferences.
Within the decentralized admission process, all students apply directly at the universities.
Students usually apply for multiple universities at the same time because they have im-
perfect information about their chances to receive an offer. At the same time, universities
make more offers than their actual capacity as they must expect some students to reject
their offer. The consequences of this procedure may be e.g. (too) late assignment, late
enrollment, and unassigned university places (e.g. Roth and Xing; 1994; Mu¨ller; 2007,
2009). Furthermore, if universities are overburdened with the new admission responsibil-
ities, they may choose the wrong applicants resulting in less human-capital production
or higher drop-out rates.
All in all, the theoretical evidence with respect to centralized and decentralized university
admission in Germany points at possible inefficiencies in both systems. Therefore, an
empirical comparison of centralized and decentralized admission procedures may provide
important insights in how these inefficiencies affect the student-university matching in
practice.
3 Estimation Strategy
For comparing the matching efficiency and the matching quality of the centralized and
decentralized university admission procedure, I exploit the abolishment of the central-
ized admission in the field of law as a natural experiment. The applied differences-
in-differences approach does not only compare the matching efficiency and quality for
admission before and after the reform, but it also compares the development over time
to a control group of university departments which have not experienced any change in
university admission.
The decentralization of university admission in the field of law offers a setting which is
very well suited for differences-in-differences estimation. As the German federal state of
North Rhine-Westphalia – unlike all other federal states – has not decentralized admission
to law schools in 2002, the six law schools of this state form a natural control group.
This allows me to compare the development in the matching efficiency and quality over
time for the treated law schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia with the control law
schools within North Rhine-Westphalia. The decision of North Rhine-Westphalia not
to decentralize admission to law schools has been taken independently of the situation
at North Rhine-Westphalian law schools. As the central clearinghouse is located within
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North Rhine-Westphalia and as also other subjects have not been decentralized in North
Rhine-Westphalia, it was rather a political motive that drove this decision. Using the
regional variation between federal states for identification has the advantage that I can
compare schools within the same subject. Thus, differences between subjects, e.g. a
different student body, do not influence my results. However, regional differences and
changes in the composition of treatment and control group, i.e. prospective students now
applying for law studies outside of North Rhine-Westphalia because admission has been
decentralized, may affect the results of this comparison.
Therefore, I consider medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia as an additional,
second control group. Admission to medical schools was organized centrally over the en-
tire observation period and thus was unaffected by the decentralization process in the
field of law studies. For this second control group, it is less likely that the composition
of treatment and control group changes as treatment and control group differ in subject.
Furthermore, university departments of the treatment and control group in this compar-
ison are located within the same geographical region. Thus, regional differences do not
influence the estimations employing the second control group. Differing trends between
both subjects over time, however, may affect this alternative differences-in-differences
approach. Therefore, my estimations account for differing time trends.
Being able to apply a differences-in-differences analysis with two alternative control
groups is an advantage because both approaches complement each other and therefore in-
crease the reliability of my estimation strategy. The formal representation of the classical
differences-in-differences analysis for both alternative control groups reads as follows:
yit = α1LAWtreatedi × AFTERt + α2LAWtreatedi + α3AFTERt + α4Xit + it (1)
The outcome yit for university department i in year t represents the outcome variables (i)
the number of matriculated students, (ii) the number of unassigned university places and
(iii) the share of drop-outs. These measures of matching efficiency and matching quality
are described in more detail in Section 4. The classical differences-in-differences approach
includes as explanatory variables a binary variable indicating the treated law schools
LAWtreatedi for which university admission has been decentralized, a binary variable
indicating the years after the decentralization AFTERt, and the interaction between
these two variables LAWtreatedi × AFTERt, which coefficient represents the effect of
interest. The classical approach, thus, controls for differences between treated schools
and control schools and for differences over time before and after the decentralization
of university admission in the field of law studies. The interaction of interest – i.e. the
effect of decentralizing university admission – thus only picks up changes in matching
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efficiency and matching quality after the reform which are not simultaneously observed
in the control group.
Furthermore, I include additional covariates Xit to control for the introduction of tu-
ition fees from 2006 onwards and for the introduction of an excellence status for some
universities within an excellence competition run by the German Government.9 The co-
variates also include separate time trends for the treated schools and the control schools
by interacting a binary variable indicating the treated schools and control schools respec-
tively with a continuous variable for all years of observation. These interactions account
for linear time trends in the treated schools and the control schools before the reform
and therefore avoid a bias in the estimates merely driven by differing time trends. The
descriptive evidence (Figures 2 - 4) suggests that especially subject-specific time trends
may be important for the comparison with medical schools. Using a continuous year
variable assumes linear time trends. This assumption is justifiable as the matching qual-
ity indicators indeed seem to develop approximately linear before the decentralization in
2002.
An alternative estimation approach exploits the panel structure of the data by accounting
for university department fixed effects. With this approach, the estimation merely relies
on the variation over time on the level of university departments. Everything that is
constant over time for a specific law or medical school is netted out. Thus, adding the
fixed effect to the estimation equation allows a more precise analysis by estimating the
following equation:
yit = β1LAWtreatedi × AFTERt + β2AFTERt + β3Xit + υit + it (2)
The effect of interest is again the coefficient of the interaction LAWtreatedi ×AFTERt
which estimates the effect of decentralizing university admission on the outcomes yit rep-
resenting matching efficiency and matching quality. In this specification, the fixed effect
υit captures all school-specific and time-constant variation in matching efficiency and
quality. Therefore, the time-constant indicator variable LAWtreatedi is not identifiable
– in other words not necessary – and is thus dropped. All other covariates are the same
as in Equation 1. The standard errors are clustered by university departments.
The decentralization of university admission for law studies in 2002 is a suitable natural
experiment in university admission for several reasons. First, it offers two appropriate
control groups to identify the effect of decentralizing university admission. Second, it
allows me to disentangle the change in university admission from the European Bologna
Process introducing a new (Bachelor and Master) degree system throughout Europe.
9For a more detailed analysis of the excellence competition see Horstschra¨er (2011).
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Until this day, the degree system in law and medical studies remains unaffected by the
Bologna Process. As a certain quality standard of law and medical graduates is of public
interest, the final degree in both subjects has always been a centralized national exam.
Third, the decentralization in law studies was already implemented in 2002, which offers
the opportunity to observe five post-treatment years that are not affected by the intro-
duction of tuition fees in some federal states. Fourth, the same timing argument applies
for the excellence competition carried out by the German government in 2006 and 2007.
Hence, the natural experiment in university admission for law studies allows me to iden-
tify the isolated effect of a change from a centralized towards a decentralized admission
procedure.
4 Data
For the evaluation of the change from a centralized towards a decentralized university
admission, I use administrative student data comprising individual information on all
matriculated students in Germany over the years 1995 to 2008. The data set is provided
by the statistical offices of Germany and relies on the registration data reported by
each German university.10 The advantage of the administrative student data is that I
can observe all students in Germany over a long period of time. The data set contains
detailed information on the course of studies and a limited number of student background
variables.
The outcome measures I use to evaluate the decentralization of university admission aim
at assessing the matching efficiency and the matching quality of the admission procedure.
Matching efficiency in this context means the quantitative outcome of the admission
process, e.g. the number of students that are matched to a university. This aspect
is important as it may reveal that the admission procedure yields an inefficient use of
resources, which might be the case if not all supplied university places can be filled. The
matching quality additionally evaluates whether students are assigned at universities that
fit them with respect to e.g. their preferences or ability. The outcome measures I use to
proxy matching efficiency and matching quality are:
1. The number of first-year students
2. The number of unassigned university places
3. The drop-out rate
10Statistical Office Germany, Higher Education Statistics.
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The number of first-year students assesses the matching efficiency of the student-univer-
sity matching, i.e. the number of recently matriculated students. This outcome variable
has been chosen in spirit of the matching function applied by the empirical literature on
job-matching, in which new hires represent the job-matching outcome. For transferring
the job matching function concept to student-university matching one-to-one, I would
need to explain the number of first-year students by the number of applicants and the
number of supplied university places. Unfortunately, no data on the number of appli-
cants is available for the law schools which decentralized admission. Therefore, I use the
number of first-year students as a first crude proxy for the matching efficiency and take
the number of supplied university places into account for my second outcome variable.
The second outcome measure of the matching efficiency is the number of unassigned
university places, i.e. the difference between the number of university places a university
supplies and the number of first-year students.11 This second indicator allows a more
detailed analysis with respect to the matching efficiency as it takes the supply side into
account. The effect of the decentralization on this outcome is especially interesting as
a high number of unassigned places has often been mentioned as a disadvantage of the
less regulated decentralized admission procedure. It is also important to mention that
the differences between the amount of supplied university places and the number of
matriculated students can turn negative if the number of matriculated students exceeds
the a priori fixed amount of university places to be supplied. This situation occurs for
example if more students than expected accept a university’s offer.12 Also, for this second
outcome it would be desirable to account for the number of applicants in order to focus
solely on the matching efficiency. As this data is unfortunately not available, the second
measure of matching efficiency – the number of unassigned university places – can also
be influenced by changing numbers of applicants. The measures of matching efficiency
therefore may also comprise the attractiveness to apply for studies under the respective
admission procedure.
The third outcome measure I consider is the drop-out rate within the first year of studies.
It proxies the matching quality. As students who are allocated to a university that does
not fit them – with respect to their preferences or ability – will face a higher risk of
dropping out, the drop-out rate measures the consequences of the initial matching quality.
The drop-out rate of university i for the first-year students of year t is calculated by
dividing the number of second-year students at university i in year t + 1 by the number
11The numbers of supplied university places for the universities within the centralized admission pro-
cedure have been provided by the central clearinghouse. The according data for the law schools with
decentralized admission has been inquired directly at all 16 federal state ministries of education and
research. For the federal state of Bavaria, I had to contact each university directly as the state ministry
could not provide the data.
12In fact, the number of matriculated students is regularly above the fixed number of university places
within the centralized admission procedure (see Figure 3 in Section 5).
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of first-year students at university i in year t. I restrict my analysis to the drop-outs
after one year of studies as most drop-outs occur within the first year. Furthermore,
by restricting my analysis to a one-year time lag, I lose only one year of observation
(2008) for the drop-out analysis. Due to a missing panel identifier on an individual level,
I am not able to construct the individual drop-out rate. The drop-out rate, as I define
it, thus also captures the likelihood that a student completely cancels his studies as
well as the likelihood that he changes subject or university within his first year of studies.
Therefore, the drop-out rate is a measure of the universities’ ability to retain its students.
This approximation seems to be reasonable because changes between universities are not
very common within the first year of studies.
For the differences-in-differences analysis, I apply two different samples. In order to com-
pare law schools in (control) and outside of (treated) the federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia, I keep all German law schools (in and outside of North Rhine-Westphalia)
in the first sample. All university departments of other subjects are dropped. The sec-
ond sample consists of all law (treated) and medical (control) schools outside of North
Rhine-Westphalia. Thus, I delete all departments of other subjects and all observations
from within North Rhine-Westphalia. In both samples, I do not consider students at two
private universities13 as they have never been part of the centralized admission process.
Furthermore, I also restrict my analysis to the semesters starting in fall. Although uni-
versity admission in general is possible twice a year – for the semester starting in spring
and for the semester starting in fall – many universities only admit students in fall.
All three outcomes are measured on the university department level. Therefore, I ag-
gregate the data by university departments.14 By aggregation, I obtain a panel data set
of law and medical schools. Table 1 lists the number of law and medical schools in the
sample for each year of the observation period. The table depicts the treated law schools
and the two control groups separately.15 In general, my data contain all public law and
medical programs existing in Germany. Only in two years few observations are missing
due to non-reported data of two federal states.
Until 2003, 34 law schools existed outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. Data for one law
school is missing in 1995 (University of Kiel) and for another one in 1997 (University of
Hamburg). These two schools are missing because data on the federal state of Schleswig-
Holstein (1995) and Hamburg (1997) are not available. These missing observations are
most likely missing at random as the federal states have not reported any data merely
13The University of Witten/Herdecke is the only private institution offering Medical Studies and the
Bucerius Law School the only private school in the field of Law.
14An analysis on the individual student level could also provide interesting insights e.g. with respect
to the drop-out risk and the amount of human-capital acquisition. However, the current data protection
law in Germany does not allow to follow individual students over time. Therefore, a panel identifier on
the individual student level is not available for the data.
15For a more detailed list of all included law and medical schools see Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Number of Law and Medical Schools by Year (1995-2008)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Law Schools “treated”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
33 34 33 34 34 34 34
Law Schools “control 1”
(in North Rhine-Westphalia)
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Medical Schools “control 2”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
24 26 25 26 26 26 26
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Law Schools “treated”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
34 34 33 33 33 33 32
Law Schools “control 1”
(in North Rhine-Westphalia)
6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Medical Schools “control 2”
(not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
due to administrative problems. In 2004, the University of Dresden and, in 2008, the
University of Rostock closed their law programs. Consequently, the number of treated
law schools drops to 33 between 2004 and 2007 and to 32 in 2008.
Within North Rhine-Westphalia, six law schools exist over the entire observation period.
Thus, although North Rhine-Westphalia is the largest German federal state, the first
control group is rather small. Therefore, I also consider all medical schools outside of
North Rhine-Westphalia as a second control group, which consists of 26 medical schools
over the entire observation period. Data are only missing for two medical schools (Uni-
versity of Kiel and University of Lu¨beck) in 1995 and for one (University of Hamburg)
in 1997. Again, the missing data is due to the unavailable data of the two federal states
Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg.16 The first sample that I use for the comparison be-
tween law schools in and outside of North Rhine-Westphalia, thus, consists of a total of
552 school-year observations. The second sample comprises the treated law schools and
the control medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia, which together amount
to 829 school-year observations.
16Note also that the two medical schools in Munich (Technical University and Ludwig-Maximilian
University) merged their programs already in 2000 and that Berlin merged its two programs (Free
University and Humboldt University) in 2003. Therefore, I aggregate the number of students of both
medical programs in Munich and in Berlin in all years. Furthermore, the University of Heidelberg offers
two medical science programs, one combined with the University of Mannheim. Although students apply
separately for both programs, matriculated students are not reported disaggregated in the administrative
student data. Therefore, I consider both programs as one.
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Figure 1: Number of Universities with no Admission Restrictions (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
The panel of law and medical schools is not balanced over all years as data for two federal
states are missing for one year each and as two universities closed their law programs.
However, the number of law and medical schools in Germany overall has been very stable
within the entire observation period. This ensures that the possibilities to study one of
these two subjects (supply side) have not changed severely over time.
Despite the number of law and medical schools being very stable over time, admission
restrictions in the field of law changed in the course of decentralizing admission. Figure 1
shows that, until 2002, all law schools had to fix the number of university places they were
able to supply.17 After the decentralization, 14 law schools allowed prospective students
to directly enroll into their program without any admission restrictions. This number
dropped again to only two law schools with unrestricted admission in 2005 and 2006 and
subsequently increased to nine and ten schools in 2007 and 2008. These frequent changes
in admission restrictions directly after the decentralization, presumably, indicate that
some law schools were experimenting to find a suitable admission procedure.
In order to distinguish the effect of abolishing all admission restrictions from abolishing
the central coordination by the central clearinghouse, I estimate the decentralization effect
also on a sample only consisting of universities that never (not in a single year) abolished
17However, for some unpopular universities these numbers in fact did not restrict admission because
the universities - especially in the years prior to the decentralization - could not fill all supplied places
(see Figure 3).
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their admission restrictions. This constraint in general reduces the number of treated law
schools in the sample from 34 to 16 schools for which admission has always been restricted.
As admission to the control law and medical schools has always been restricted within
the centralized admission procedure, no observations of the control groups are dropped.
As a consequence, the number of observations in the first sample, using the law schools
in North Rhine-Westphalia as controls, drops from 552 observations to 301. The second
sample, including the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia as controls, is
reduced from 829 to 578 observations.
5 Descriptive Evidence
By depicting the development of the three different matching outcomes over time, I
provide first descriptive evidence on whether the matching efficiency and the matching
quality have changed in the course of decentralizing university admission. Furthermore,
the descriptive analyses investigate whether the differences-in-differences assumption of
common trends between treatment and control group applies. Therefore, Figures 2 - 4
depict the development over time for the number of first-year students, the number of
unassigned university places, and the drop-out rate.18
Figure 2 compares the number of first-year students at the treated law schools outside
of North Rhine-Westphalia with the law schools in North Rhine-Westphalia (first control
group) and with the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia (second con-
trol group). Immediately after the decentralization of university admission, I observe a
temporary increase in newly matriculated students from on average 300 students per uni-
versity in 2001 to on average 350 students in 2002 and 2003 for the treated law schools.
This sudden increase after the decentralization is even more remarkable as the number
of first-year students has been constantly decreasing prior to the decentralization. After
2003, the numbers of first-year students, however, decreased again and reached a level of
about nearly the same level as before the decentralization in 2001. If I restrict the sample
to the treated law schools that never dropped their admission restrictions, I only observe
a slight increase in first-year students for one year after the decentralization of admission.
Thus, the temporary increase in first-year students at all treated law schools seems to
be mainly driven by the schools which temporarily abolish all admission restrictions, i.e.
which enable students to directly enroll into their law programs.
Comparing the two groups of treated law schools to the control law schools in North
Rhine-Westphalia (left panel in Figure 2) does not indicate a change in the average
number of first-year students at the control law schools in the year directly after the
18For a mean comparison of all three outcomes see also Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Number of First-year Students over Time (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
decentralization. After 2002 however, the number of newly matriculated students drops
from above 350 students on average to about 300 students on average. This suggests that
the composition of the control law schools might indeed be affected by the decentraliza-
tion with a little time lag. The differences-in-differences assumption of common trends,
however, is supported as the development of the treatment and control law schools over
time is very similar prior to the reform in university admission. The comparison with
the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia (right panel in Figure 2) shows
that the number of first-year students within the second control group does not seem to
be influenced by the decentralization process. The number of matriculated students at
medical schools is constantly increasing to a moderate extent over the entire observation
period. The development of the treatment and the second control group over time differ
prior to the reform. Accounting for differing time trends, therefore, is more important
for the comparison with the control medical schools.
As the development over time of the number of supplied university places is similar to
the development of the number of first-year students (see Figure 3), a change in the
number of first-year students after the decentralization could also be merely induced by
adjustments in the supply of places. Therefore, Figure 3 depicts the difference between
the number of university places and the number of first-year students per university, i.e.
the number of unassigned university places, which is an important second outcome with
respect to the matching efficiency.
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For both treatment groups (two panels at the top of Figure 3), the number of first-year
students and the number of supplied university places diverge prior to the decentraliza-
tion. Neither the number of supplied places nor the matching mechanism changed within
this period. Therefore, this development is most likely driven by decreasing numbers
of applications. This interpretation is even more likely as one argument for the decen-
tralization of admission has been that the supply of places is not scarce anymore. The
gap between the actually matriculated students and the supplied places is larger in the
sample containing all treated law schools than in the restricted sample. Thus, I can infer
that mainly the less demanded universities decided to drop all admission restrictions.
After the decentralization, the average number of first-year students – as already shown
in Figure 2 – increases instantaneously. In addition, the number of supplied places also
increases in 2002, however, only to a very moderate extent. This development of the
number of first-year students and supplied university places results in a decrease of unas-
signed university places. Within the sample of treated law schools applying admission
restrictions in all years, the decrease in the number of unassigned places (as also the
increase in matriculated students – see Figure 2) has been smaller than within the full
sample of treated law schools. In the following years, the universities sometimes admitted
more students than they had offered places, and sometimes places remained unassigned.
Despite smaller gaps between the number of university places and the number of first-year
students after the decentralization, it seems as if universities that were responsible for
admission themselves were not able to allocate places very precisely.
Centralized admission to the control law and medical schools seems to yield a precise
matching with a low level of unassigned places (see two panels at the bottom of Figure 3).
In fact, the average number of first-year students is always above the a priori fixed
number of supplied university places within both control groups. It seems as if the
centralized procedure admits rather too many than too few prospective students.19 The
centralized matching procedure, nevertheless, seems to be more precise compared to the
decentralized admission as the difference between the supplied places and the newly
matriculated students is basically constant over time. While the control medical schools
do not seem to adjust their number of supplied places in course of the reform, the control
law schools seem to adjust their supply similar to the treated law schools. This indicates
again that the composition of the control group of law schools may not be independent
of the reform process.
Descriptive evidence with respect to the drop-out rates exhibits no explicit influence of the
decentralization process (Figure 4). Neither the treatment groups nor the control groups
show major changes in drop-outs from 2002 onwards. Furthermore, the development
19As universities within the centralized admission process still directly admit foreign students, this
could – at least to some degree – also induce the too high numbers of first-year students.
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Figure 3: Number of University Places and First-year Students over Time (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
over time is fairly similar for both treatment groups, which suggests that abolishing all
admission restrictions does not affect drop-out rates. Drop-outs at all treated law schools
increase between 1995 and 2008 from about 10% on average to nearly 20% on average.
The drop-out rate at the control law schools in North Rhine-Westphalia is lower compared
to the other German law schools.20 Average drop-out rates at the control medical schools
are also low (about 5%) and hardly change over the entire observation period.
In order to compare the treated schools and control schools more precisely, I use differences-
in-differences estimations. This multivariate approach also allows me to account for other
factors that may influence my outcome variables.
20The average drop-out rate at the control law schools is fairly volatile. This is due to measuring the
drop-out rate on the department rather than on the individual level and due to the small sample size of
only six schools.
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Figure 4: Mean Drop-out Rates over Time (1995-2008)
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
6 Results
The results of the differences-in-differences estimations are presented separately for the
three outcomes (i) the number of first-year students, (ii) the number of unassigned univer-
sity places, and (iii) the drop-out rate. I estimate different Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
models using both control groups – the law schools located in North Rhine-Westphalia
and the medical schools outside of North Rhine-Westphalia. The presented models are
a standard OLS regression (OLS), an OLS school fixed effect model (OLS FE I) and an
OLS school fixed effect estimation using a sample that is restricted to the treated law
schools that have never abolished their admission restrictions (OLS FE II).
6.1 Number of First-Year Students
Table 2 presents the results with respect to the number of first-year students when us-
ing the law schools of North Rhine-Westphalia as controls. The classical differences-
in-differences estimates in the first column indicate a weakly significant increase in the
number of first-year students after the decentralization of admission. After the reform, on
average 42 more students matriculated at the treated law schools. The control variables
account for significantly less matriculated students at the law schools outside of North
Rhine-Westphalia and significantly less students at all law schools from 2002 onwards.
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Table 2: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Number of First-Year Students
(Controls: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Law Treated × After 42.39* 31.16 88.79* 85.67** 35.48
(25.25) (25.43) (49.32) (22.78) (25.48)
Law Treated -56.05*** -56.05*** -27.23 – –
(17.84) (17.70) (30.25)
After -58.95** -45.31* -13.24 -13.74 -8.66
(23.25) (24.09) (45.72) (17.03) (17.27)
Covariates
Tuition Fees -31.84** 6.60 2.68 18.48
(16.17) (17.66) (10.28) (11.33)
Excellence Labels 134.66*** 227.02*** 47.42 52.22*
(45.03) (44.20) (29.13) (28.64)
Time Trends
Law Treated × Year -13.93*** -13.00*** -11.87***
(2.58) (2.19) (2.80)
Law Control × Year -6.79 -6.62 -8.32*
(5.94) (4.00) (4.15)
N 552 552 552 552 301
R2 0.0298 0.0483 0.0972 0.1571 0.3101
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Controlling for additional covariates and treatment- and control-specific time trends (col-
umn 3) increases the treatment effect to about 89 students per treated law school. The
estimate of interest remains weakly significant. The significance of the other covariates,
however, mainly disappears when I control for differing time trends. The treated law
schools show a significantly negative time trend prior to the reform, while the slightly
negative time trend for the control law schools is not significant. Estimating the same
specification in an OLS school fixed effect setting (OLS FE I) does not change the es-
timates remarkably. I find a significant increase in matriculation by about 86 students
when accounting for the negative time trend at the treated law schools.
The decentralization of university admission, however, has no significant effect on the
number of first-year students if I restrict the sample to the law schools that have always
– also after the reform – applied admission restrictions. This suggests that the estimated
increase in matriculated students is mainly driven by law schools enabling students to
directly enroll into their program. It is likely that prospective students are attracted to
studying law at the schools which dropped admission restrictions by the possibility to
directly enroll into their law program. This is especially likely for applicants who prefer
to stay at their local university as they are guaranteed a place by enrolling directly.
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Table 3: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Number of First-Year Students
(Controls: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Law Treated × After -51.45*** -49.70*** 46.18 49.70** 2.65
(16.62) (16.26) (32.16) (19.05) (21.72)
Law Treated 68.38*** 68.38*** 123.91*** – –
(11.76) (11.50) (19.73)
After 34.89*** 30.93** 32.72 24.67* 27.12**
(12.49) (12.50) (24.41) (12.61) (12.82)
Covariates
Tuition Fees -18.92 6.60 8.10 20.13
(15.49) (16.44) (12.12) (15.28)
Excellence Labels 221.02*** 227.02*** 82.34 83.42
(35.57) (35.10) (59.30) (59.88)
Time Trends
Law Treated × Year -14.76*** -13.61*** -12.60***
(2.79) (2.19) (2.92)
Medicine × Year -.93 .93 .27
(3.14) (2.35) (2.43)
N 829 829 829 829 578
R2 0.0422 0.0855 0.1157 0.1232 0.1647
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
Estimating the differences-in-differences models with the medical schools outside of North
Rhine-Westphalia as controls yields similar results (see Table 3). The OLS fixed effect
model (OLS FE I) suggests a significant increase by about 50 students after admission
has been decentralized. Again, this effect does not persist if I restrict the sample to
the law schools for which admission has always been restricted. The effect of interest is
negative in the classical differences-in-differences approach but changes in sign when I add
the subject-specific time trends. As I observe different time trends for law and medical
schools in the number of first-year students (see Figure 2), accounting for different time
trends is particularly important for the estimations using this second control group.
6.2 Number of Unassigned University Places
Another outcome measuring the matching efficiency is the number of unassigned univer-
sity places. The advantage of this outcome is that it accounts for changes in the number
of supplied university places and thus can show whether the increase in newly matricu-
lated students merely reflects the increasing supply of university places. The estimation
results for this outcome are presented in Table 4. Using the final specification of Tables
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Table 4: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on the Number
of Unassigned University Places
OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Control Group: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After -63.00** -52.09*** -35.65
(25.66) (17.40) (24.20)
Law Treated 9.01 – –
(15.69)
After 1.57 2.11*** 1.83
(23.41) (7.75) (7.74)
N 496 496 301
R2 0.1343 0.1194 0.0629
Control Group: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After -47.98*** -37.95** -23.11
(14.28) (16.46) (23.33)
Law Treated 6.90 – –
(8.62)
After -14.88 -13.05*** -13.02***
(10.37) (4.71) (4.66)
N 773 773 578
R2 0.2319 0.1245 0.0947
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1
percent level; additional covariates: tuition fees, excellence labels, treatment- and
control-specific time trends.
2 and 3, I find that the number of unassigned places at treated law schools decreased
after the change towards a decentralized admission. Employing the law schools within
North Rhine-Westphalia (the medical schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia) as a con-
trol group, yields an estimate of on average 63 (48) less unassigned places per university
in the OLS model. However, I once again only observe this decrease in the number of
unassigned places in the sample including all treated law schools. For the law schools
that restricted admission also after the decentralization, the estimations do not reveal a
significant influence of the change in admission procedures.
Hence, taking the number of supplied university places into account shows that the in-
crease in first-year students exceeds the increase in supplied university places. The re-
sulting reduction of unassigned places is, as the increase in first-year students, mainly
driven by abolishing admission restrictions. Therefore, my results with respect to the
first and second matching outcome suggest that the matching efficiency improved after
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the decentralization by enabling less demanded universities to directly enroll prospective
students without any admission selection. Note, however, that the underlying increase
in first-year students could also be driven by an increase in applicants. Due to a lack of
data, I cannot control for changes in the number of applicants. Thus, my measures of
the matching efficiency also encompass changes in the attractiveness to apply before and
after the decentralization.
6.3 Drop-Out Rate
Estimating the influence of the decentralization process on the drop-out rate is especially
interesting as the drop-out rate is an outcome with practical relevance, which is difficult
to assess in a theoretical framework. As some law schools had to drop all admission
restrictions in order to attract more students, the composition of the student body could
be affected. For example, students could be less suited for the subject of law studies or
for the respective university because students’ ability to pursue studies is not assessed
a priori by any admission criteria. Consequently, an increase in drop-out rates could
be expected. Whether the empirical data supports this hypothesis is explored by my
estimations with respect to the drop-out rate. The estimation results are displayed in
Table 5.
All specifications using both control groups show no significant effect of decentralizing
admission. However, the treatment effect is positive in the estimations on the full sample
of treated law schools (OLS, OLS FE I) and negative in the estimations on the restricted
sample of law schools that keep their admission restrictions (OLS FE II). Despite all treat-
ment effects being insignificant, this seems to support the above stated hypothesis that
lower admission restrictions could attract students with a higher drop-out probability.
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Table 5: The Effect of Decentralized Admission on Drop-Out
Rates
OLS OLS FE I OLS FE II
Control Group: Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After 1.73 1.63 -1.39
(4.30) (4.59) (4.64)
Law Treated 6.63** – –
(2.74)
After -2.14 -1.97 -1.37
(3.98) (4.32) (4.24)
N 513 513 279
R2 0.1526 0.1244 0.0959
Control Group: Medical Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
Law Treated × After .21 .10 -2.58
(2.95) (3.40) (3.42)
Law Treated 6.27*** – –
(1.89)
After -.65 -.30 -.05
(2.23) (3.39) (3.47)
N 769 769 535
R2 0.2391 0.0578 0.0328
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations; clus-
tered standard errors in parentheses; */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1
percent level; additional covariates: tuition fees, excellence labels, treatment- and
control-specific time trends.
7 Conclusion
This paper set out to examine a natural experiment in university admission. Using
a differences-in-differences approach, I estimate the effect of decentralizing admission
to German law schools (outside the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia) on the
efficiency and the quality of the resulting student-university matching. My estimation
strategy employs two different control groups for which admission has been centrally
administered over the entire observation period. The first group are the law schools within
North Rhine-Westphalia, and the second are the medical schools outside of North Rhine-
Westphalia. Moreover, the administrative student data on all students within Germany
allow me to measure the effect with respect to three different outcomes: (i) the number
of first-year students, (ii) the number of unassigned university places, (iii) the drop-
out rate. My quantitative evaluation complements the prominent theoretical literature
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on college admission and its matching efficiency. The advantage of evaluation studies,
in this context, is that they can also quantify how prevalent (theoretically identified)
inefficiencies are in practice.
My results show that the number of first-year students on average increased and that the
number of unassigned places on average decreased at the law schools which decentral-
ized admission. This increase in the matching efficiency is mainly driven by law schools
abolishing all admission restrictions, which enabled students to enroll into a law pro-
gram without any application process. In fact, my estimations show no significant effect
of the decentralization for the highly demanded schools which always restricted admis-
sion. However, the decentralization has positive effects with respect to the matching
efficiency for the less demanded schools because they can adjust or completely abolish
their admission restrictions. As the matching efficiency increases by lowering admission
restrictions, the decentralization of admission could also be associated with a decreasing
matching quality assessed by the drop-out rate. My results show no significant effects
in this dimension but hint at higher drop-out rates for universities softening admission
restrictions.
The improved matching efficiency after the decentralization is based on an increase in
matriculated students. This increase may also be driven by changes in the number of
applicants before and after the decentralization process. As no data on the number of
applicants is available for the law schools which decentralized admission, I cannot control
for changes in the number of applicants. Therefore, my outcomes with respect to the
matching efficiency might also capture the difference in the attractiveness to apply before
and after the reform. In order to evaluate merely the matching mechanism, it would be
necessary to take the number of applicants into account. If this data were available, an
estimation strategy corresponding to the empirical job matching literature could be a
possible path to proceed. The matching function for student-university matching would
need to describe how the stock of applicants and supplied university places translate into
the matching outcome of newly matriculated students.
In this regard, I believe that my study is only a first attempt to evaluate a reform in
university admission with respect to its matching outcomes in practice. Further research
exploiting other natural experiments in university admission is highly desirable. For
example, a comparison of a theoretically more efficient centralized system with a decen-
tralized system is interesting empirical work for future research. Moreover, also changes
within centralized admission procedures are important to evaluate in order to improve
our knowledge on optimal matching procedures. Assessing the differences in real-life out-
comes between the centralized student- and college-optimal matching algorithm could
be very promising as both procedures are efficient from a theoretical perspective. Such
an emerging empirical literature exploiting natural experiments in the admission process
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could take on an important role in assessing how different admission procedures affect the
student-university matching in practice and, consequently, in designing better matching
procedures.
Considering the theoretical knowledge on the optimality of different matching algorithms,
it is surprising how diverse admission procedures are organized all over the world. At
present, several countries are discussing to reform their centralized admission procedure.
German politicians and practitioners, for instance, have been discussing a new university
admission procedure for several years now. Furthermore, the central authority ‘UCAS’
administering admissions in the UK initiated the “Admissions Process Review” that is
supposed to “map future models of admissions that could deliver improved efficiencies”
(UCAS; 2011). Within this transformation process, evaluating already existing admission
procedures could be an important factor.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Mean Statistics of First-year Students, Unassigned University Places and
Drop-out Rates
Before Decentralization After Decentralization
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Treated Law Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 321.5 105.0 305.0 113.1
Unassigned Places 26.9 62.0 22.24 54.7
Drop-out Rate 13.2 7.9 17.2 8.9
Treated Law Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia (Adm. Restr.)
First-year Students 360.5 117.2 313.0 115.6
Unassigned Places 8.3 50.6 4.8 38.8
Drop-out Rate 10.0 8.3 12.3 8.0
Control Law Schools in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 377.6 107.3 318.6 69.4
Unassigned Places -14.5 23.0 -11.8 28.2
Drop-out Rate 6.2 8.9 7.7 12.4
Control Medicine Schools not in North Rhine-Westphalia
First-year Students 253.1 104.7 288.0 150.6
Unassigned Places -13.6 26.9 -26.9 48.2
Drop-out Rate 4.4 15.1 4.0 7.4
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008), own calculations.
Table A.2: Universities Offering Law and/or Medical Studies in or Outside of North Rhine-Westphalia
University of... Law Medicine North Rh.-Westph. University of... Law Medicine North Rh.-Westph.
Aachen no yes yes Heidelberg yes yes no
Augsburg yes no no Jena yes yes no
Bayreuth yes no no Kiel yes yes no
Berlin (Charite´) no yes no Cologne yes yes yes
Berlin (Humboldt) yes no no Constance yes no no
Berlin (Free U.) yes no no Leipzig yes yes no
Bielefeld yes no yes Lu¨beck no yes no
Bochum yes yes yes Magdeburg no yes no
Bonn yes yes yes Mainz yes yes no
Bremen yes no no Mannheim yes no no
Dresden yes yes no Marburg yes yes no
Duisburg-Essen no yes yes Munich yes yes no
Du¨sseldorf yes yes yes Mu¨nster yes yes yes
Erlangen-Nuremberg yes yes no Osnabru¨ck yes no no
Frankfurt(Main) yes yes no Passau yes no no
Frankfurt(Oder) yes no no Potsdam yes no no
Freiburg yes yes no Regensburg yes yes no
Giessen yes yes no Rostock yes yes no
Go¨ttingen yes yes no Saarbru¨cken yes yes no
Greifswald yes yes no Trier yes no no
Halle yes yes no Tu¨bingen yes yes no
Hamburg yes yes no Ulm no yes no
Hannover yes yes no Wu¨rzburg yes yes no
Data Source: Administrative Student Data (1995-2008).
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